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ABSTRACT
Events in Thailand during 2016 were overshadowed by the death of long-reigning
King Bhumibol Adulyadej on October 13, and the entire nation’s mourning. Despite
the popular approval of a new constitution in August 2016, Thailand’s military
regime showed no sign of relinquishing power during this time of considerable
national anxiety.
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WITHIN MINUTES OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, Facebook pages and news
websites across Thailand lost their customary brightness. King Bhumibol
Adulyadej, the world’s longest-reigning monarch, passed away on October
13, 2016, and the Thai nation went into mourning monochrome. The death
of the ailing 88-year-old King had been widely anticipated: King Bhumibol
had spent most of the previous eight years in Siriraj Hospital. Yet after his
seven extraordinary decades on the throne, his demise came as an enormous
shock to Thais, most of whom had known no other ruler. They had ample
reason to be extremely fearful about the future. At the end of 2016, Thailand
lay in metaphorical darkness.
POLITICS
The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta that
seized power in the May 2, 2014 coup, remained ﬁrmly in control of the
country during 2016, although the original justiﬁcations for the power sei-
zure—the need to prevent violent conﬂict, heal political divides, and ‘‘restore
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national happiness’’—no longer appeared salient. Political opposition and
indeed all forms of dissent had been ﬁrmly suppressed through a policy of
widespread arrests and intimidation. Critics of the junta had been repeatedly
harassed, many of them summoned to military bases to undergo spells of
‘‘attitude adjustment.’’ Such measures provoked damning criticism from the
UN Human Rights Council and a range of international observers.1 Repres-
sing dissenting voices did nothing to bridge Thailand’s existing political
divides, which persisted just beneath the surface of public life.
The many Thais who supported the regime—including large sections of
the Bangkok middle class—continued to tolerate or ignore the military’s
repression, which did not touch them personally. But for opponents of the
regime, including supporters of former Prime Ministers Thaksin Shinawatra,
now living in self-imposed exile in Dubai, and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra,
who now faces government demands to pay US$ 1 billion in compensation
for a failed rice program during her tenure in ofﬁce, happiness remained
a distant prospect. For them, the 2014 coup was not a project to create
national reconciliation, but a crude attempt to suppress representative
democracy. Given the unwelcome prospect of a return to power by pro-
Thaksin politicians, the junta seemed in no particular hurry to hold elections,
which had initially been promised for 2016 but were later postponed to late
2017 or early 2018.
Military rule in 2016 was clearly both an anachronism and a huge inter-
national embarrassment. But as time went on, it became increasingly appar-
ent that the junta had no answers to Thailand’s central political problem:
how to craft a legitimate polity. Legitimacy was contested, residing alterna-
tively in the electoral system, in the oft-changing constitution, or in the extra-
constitutional authority and charisma of the monarch.
Uneasy with a legalist approach, the NCPO seemed initially in no hurry to
emulate the 1991 and 2006 coup-makers by drafting a new constitution. After
the junta orchestrated the rejection of the 2015 draft constitution prepared
under the relatively liberal chairmanship of Bowornsak Uwanno,2 the process
began again under a new Constitution Drafting Committee chaired by the
ever-serviceable veteran conservative jurist Meechai Ruchupan. But even
1. ‘‘Thailand: UN Review Highlights Junta’s Hypocrisy,’’ Human Rights Watch, May 11, 2016,
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/11/thailand-un-review-highlights-juntas-hypocrisy>.
2. Duncan McCargo, ‘‘Peopling Thailand’s 2015 Draft Constitution,’’ Contemporary Southeast
Asia 37, no. 3 (2015), pp. 329–354.
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Meechai’s draft proved too progressive for the NCPO, whose number two,
Prawit Wongsuwan, ‘‘suggested’’ a number of important changes.
Key elements in the 2016 draft constitution were: a wholly appointed
senate, effectively hand-picked by the ruling junta; six reserved senate seats
for senior security commanders; a lower house comprising 350 constituency
MPs and 150 party-list MPs, selected by a multi-member apportionment
system;3 a continuing role for the NCPO in a 20-year program of reforms;
and the option to appoint an unelected prime minister. The provisions for an
appointed senate and an unelected prime minister would roll back Thai
politics to the early 1990s or before. It was an open secret that NCPO leader
General Prayut Chan-ocha was eyeing the position of prime minister himself:
the new charter could effectively continue the junta’s rule long after the
proposed election. Following the precedent set by the 2007 constitution,
a referendum to approve the draft was set for August 7, providing Thais their
ﬁrst substantive opportunity for political participation in over two years.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
During the lead-up to the referendum, debate on the constitution was largely
suppressed. Politicians and opposition groups were threatened with arrest for
raising critical questions about the draft; the vaguely worded and draconian
Article 61 of the Referendum Act, which made it illegal to ‘‘sow confusion’’
about the referendum and so promote ‘‘disorder,’’ made nonsense of the idea
that the public was being seriously consulted. At times, the NCPO’s sup-
pression of debate generated into sheer farce. Among those arrested for anti-
referendum activities were two eight-year-old girls in Khamphaeng Phet, who
said they had torn down voter lists to repurpose the pretty pink paper. When
scores of monkeys in Pichit vandalized voter lists, prominent law professor
Worajet Pakeerat facetiously expressed concern that the macaques might be
ill-treated by the authorities.
In June the Election Commission issued a promotional music video enti-
tled ‘‘7 August Referendum, Unite to Secure Democracy,’’ which attracted
criticism for portraying northeastern voters as naive and easily manipulated;
3. Multi-member apportionment would adversely affect any large pro-Thaksin party; see Allen
Hicken and Bangkok Pundit, ‘‘The Effects of Thailand’s Proposed Electoral System,’’ Asian Corre-
spondent, February 10, 2016, <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/02/the-effects-of-thailands-
proposed-electoral-system/>.
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a week later, the commission was forced to reissue the video with new lyrics.
The episode clearly illustrated that the commission was not acting as a neutral
election agency but was actively promoting a yes vote by patronizing and
misrepresenting those who disagreed with the draft constitution. The same
pattern could be seen in a commission leaﬂet summarizing the draft, which
was distributed to every household in Thailand: it glossed over all the con-
troversial features of the charter, explaining neither the proposed electoral
system nor the means by which the senate would be selected. Meanwhile,
very few Thai voters had even seen a hard copy of the constitution, let alone
read its 105 pages and 279 articles from beginning to end. Many people
undoubtedly voted for the draft constitution mainly in the hope that this
would hasten elections and a return to normalcy. The consequences of voting
no remained unclear.
The draft constitution was approved by 61.35% of those who voted.4
An ambiguously-worded second question, asking voters to agree that the
next prime minister might be a non-elected ﬁgure, was approved by
58.07%. Turnout was 59.40%. The 2007 constitutional referendum had
achieved a broadly similar 56.69% yes vote, and a turnout of 57.61%. But
compared with the Prayut government’s 80% turnout target, participation in
the 2016 referendum was disappointing. Millions of Thais are ‘‘urbanized
villagers,’’ registered to vote in rural areas but living and working in and
around Bangkok. Very few of these absentees bothered to travel home and
cast their ballots.
The 2016 referendum results did not support military narratives about the
restoration of national happiness. Despite the NCPO’s suppression of dis-
senting views, around 40% of the population still voted against the draft
charter and an unelected premier. Thailand remained a deeply divided
nation: 22 provinces out of 77 rejected the draft, as did the populous north-
east region as a whole. The draft was decisively rejected in the Muslim-
majority southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—which
had comfortably approved the 2007 charter. The ‘‘no’’ vote in the Deep
South was a reaction against ill-considered provisions in the draft to grant
special protection to Buddhism, and illustrated the sensitivity of religious
4. Election Commission of Thailand, ofﬁcial results of August 7, 2016, referendum, issued
August 10, 2016, <http://www.ect.go.th/th/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ect110816.pdf>.
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and ethnic issues.5 While the polling had been relatively peaceful, a series of
bombs went off in southern resort towns in the days following the referen-
dum, killing four people and injuring more than 30 others.
THAI ECONOMY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
Thailand’s economy remained largely in the doldrums during 2016. The
Asian Development Bank expected GDP growth to reach 3.2%, a modest
improvement on the 2.8% ﬁgure for 2015, but much lower than both average
growth across ASEAN, or the 7.2% Thailand had achieved under an elected
government in 2012. The economy was helped by a ﬁscal-stimulus program
spearheaded by Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak, as well as
impressive numbers of tourist arrivals from mainland China. But lengthy
royal mourning was expected to dampen domestic economic activity and
have adverse impacts on tourism. In the longer term, Thailand faces strong
competition for foreign direct investment from both Burma and Vietnam,
and continues to be handicapped by infrastructure problems that include
a creakingly sclerotic rail system. Thailand’s very low birth rate of around 1.4
means the working-age population will peak in 2017, deepening reliance on
migrant labor in the decades to come.
In June 2016, Thailand was defeated by Kazakhstan for a rotating seat on
the UN Security Council. The scale of the defeat—138 votes to 55—illustrated
Thailand’s relative international isolation since the May 2014 military coup,
despite its serving as 2016 chair of the United Nations’ Group of 77, an
intergovernmental organization for developing countries. Thailand’s brief
detention and subsequent deportation of Hong Kong pro-democracy activist
Joshua Wong in October was the latest in a series of politicized expulsions
apparently designed to curry favor with Beijing, and so to offset American
and Western disapproval of the ruling junta.6 Yet despite distinctly cool
relations with the United States, the annual joint military exercises known
as Cobra Gold were staged again in Thailand in February, albeit on a reduced
scale.
5. Field notes, Pattani and Narathiwat Provinces, August 5 to 9, 2016.
6. Shawn Crispin, ‘‘China-Thailand Relations in the Spotlight with Activist Deportation,’’ The
Diplomat, October 7, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/china-thailand-relations-in-the-
spotlight-with-activist-deportation/>.
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MOURNING AND SUCCESSION
For most Thais, the death of King Bhumibol on October 13, 2016, was both
highly distressing and somewhat unreal. As Montesano and Chong wrote in
a wonderful obituary, ‘‘By the middle decades of his reign, the monarchy
played a role in Thai life that would have been unimaginable just a few
decades earlier. Thais ﬁrmly associated it with their self-image as citizens of
a successful country.’’7 The King’s demise left Thais with much to reﬂect
upon: their memories of a monarch who had personally symbolized the
country’s remarkable socioeconomic transformation; their hopes and fears
about the impending royal succession; and the need to reimagine themselves
in a post-Bhumibol Thailand.
Immediately prior to King Bhumibol’s death, Crown Prince Vajiralong-
korn and other members of the royal family had gathered at Siriraj Hospital.
Despite general expectations that the crown prince would quickly be pro-
claimed king, General Prayut announced that the heir to the throne ﬁrst
wished to mourn his father for an unspeciﬁed period. The prime minister
declared a one-year mourning period, during which all civil servants would
wear only black and white. The next day, as tributes poured in from around
the world, the late king’s remains were transported to the Grand Palace,
watched by huge crowds of mourners gathered around the royal grounds
known as the Sanam Luang, where his ceremonial cremation pyre will be
constructed.
Shortly afterwards, in a move that surprised many observers, 96-year-old
Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanond was appointed acting
regent; former Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien, age 89, then assumed
Prem’s Privy Council role. Thailand had embarked upon a highly unusual
genuine interregnum. Normally, a regent acts on behalf of a monarch who is
not able to perform royal duties, but at this time Thailand had no monarch.8
In a further twist, just two weeks after his father’s passing Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn quietly left Bangkok for his main home near Munich, with-
out specifying a date for his return. Widespread speculation about the mean-
ing of these developments could not be expressed publicly in Thailand, where
a new le`se-majeste´ crackdown began in the aftermath of King Bhumibol’s
7. Michael J. Montesano and Terence Chong, ‘‘King Who Won a Place in His Nation’s Heart,’’
Straits Times, October 14, 2016.
8. See Article 24 of the 2007 Constitution.
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demise.9 These were also uncomfortable times for people who deviated from
socially prescribed mourning behavior and sentiments, some of whom faced
harassment by zealous royalists.10
UPDATE
On December 1, 2016, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn—who had ﬂown in
from Germany that very morning—was ﬁnally proclaimed King Rama X.
Rather than reﬂecting awkward negotiations with the ruling junta, the new
King’s astrologically propitious 50-day appointment delay illustrated Rama
X’s determination to rule Thailand entirely according to his own wishes and
whims. Although King Vajiralongkorn was quick to reinstall General Prem to
the presidency of the Privy Council, new appointments to his advisory body
included a number of hardline military ofﬁcers known for their tough anti-
Thaksin stances. While Thaksin had initially hoped that the new reign might
usher in a new political era, even including an amnesty that would allow him
to return to Thailand, he was to be bitterly disappointed. Although Thaksin
had sometimes previously enjoyed good relations with the Crown Prince,
once Vajiralongkorn had attained the throne—and all the attendant resources
of the Royal Household and the Crown Property Bureau—the still-
ambitious former premier had become more old nuisance than future ally.
At the end of 2016, the draft constitution approved by voters in the August
referendum had yet to receive royal assent. The schedule for the late King
Bhumibol’s cremation had not been announced, and the long period of royal
mourning meant that mass political demonstrations remained impossible.
While in theory a general election could still be held at the very end of
2017, realistically polls were most unlikely before 2018. Meanwhile, the pas-
sage of a draconian new Computer Crime Act in December 2016 would help
the ruling junta suppress online political dissent. But among the ﬁrst bills to
be signed by King Vajiralongkorn was the Haj Activities Support Act, a long-
standing aspiration of Thailand’s Muslim community; its approval suggested
an implicit rebuke to Buddhist chauvinist groups that had opposed the
legislation, symbolizing a Kingly sympathy for diversity.
9. ‘‘Junta Steps Up Censorship, Surveillance on Le`se Majeste´,’’ Prachatai, November 11, 2016,
<http://prachatai.org/english/node/6690>.
10. ‘‘Thai Minister Urges ‘Social Sanctions’ as Mobs Hunt Royal Critics,’’ Daily Mail, October
18, 2016.
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